Unlurker
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tosh
19m
There is NO realistic scenario where AI wipes out all of humanity (twitter.com)
golem14
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6m
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My most likely doom scenario is that a frontier model convinces the CIC to press the nuclear retaliation button. Maybe this will only kill 90% of humans, but as far as I am concerned, that’s good enough.
Athanase000
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12m
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I think a realistic scenario is mass murders triggered by AI psychosis. Some weirdos start an AI cult and end up killing a bunch of randos because the AI said doing so would break the matrix or something similar. I am actually surprised this hasn't happened yet.
imwally
6h 0m
Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography (security.apple.com)
pmlnr
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3m
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At this point it'd be easier to return to film.
demibabs
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12m
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> or via software-level jailbreak of the device. I’m surprised that even Apple calls jailbreaking, jailbreaking. Doesn’t that imply their own software is a jail?
rickdeckard
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19m
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To me the weakest spot of this whole endeavor is how this will create false confidence in a story just because the accompanying images pass Apple's verification. Like with the Watch Ultra (attacking the diving-watch market with the sheer volume-scale of selling the development to everyone buying a Watch Ultra), Apple is attacking the trusted-imaging market with the same strategy. Okay, fine. Will work for sure, this will disrupt the forensic-imaging market and moreover make Apple a service-provider in this industry. But creating this impression and media-buzz that Apple is now verifying more than just the digital authenticity of an image may shift the public scrutiny of MANY media/online statements: There is a risk that random claims (and propaganda) will be given more credibility in the public eye just because they came with images that were confirmed to be "taken like this on an iPhone"
keiferski
35m
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Hey I predicted this awhile ago. Although it is kind of an obvious solution so I can’t claim much insight hehe. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44135416
jeroenhd
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25m
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By the time you made your comment, such a system had already been invented, even partially rolled out: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Credentials Apple's protocol differs in that it requires a timestamping server to sign the file and centralising Apple as the single arbiter of truth. An excellent addition, if you trust Apple and the governments they're friendly with (I don't, especially the latter part).
bawolff
1h 18m
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This is cool, but also seem really complex and i'm not sure it makes sense pragmatically. - it sounds like its an optional mode you have to enable. That kind of defeats the point if you need to prove something after the fact - i guess you need internet to take a picture. :( - You are puting a lot of trust in apple's private cloud compute platform. - apple can revoke certification of a picture. I understand the appeal of this, all security systems eventually have failures, so its important to be robust against this. However if the point is to prove a picture is real (especially politically damaging ones), this is giving a lot of power to apple. Its meant to be in competition with C2PA, and i guess the idea is its much more secure against complex hardware attacks. However i think its worth asking who the target audience is and what threats they face. The primary issue with AI is it makes fake photos easy, not that it invented fake photos. Even Stalin manipulated photos back in the day. It is not a new thing, the problem is just being overwhelmed with them. with that in mind, are complex hardware attacks really that important? We just need to increase the difficulty floor, not solve fake photos for all time. No matter what you do, people can still use practical effects. It seems like this is almost trying to thwart spies and nation state adversaries, well forgetting that such well funded groups have the budget to fake photos the old fashioned way or if they really cared, bribe their way into apple.
calmingsolitude
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21m
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> it sounds like its an optional mode you have to enable [..] i guess you need internet to take a picture. :( It’s opt-in because your photo is sent to Apple’s servers. Only if it were on-device should they even consider making it default. > are complex hardware attacks really that important? No, but the floor shouldn’t be “trivially exploitable” like C2PA[0]. It’d be interesting if there were a middle ground but we don’t have anything like that as of now. [0] https://www.da.vidbuchanan.co.uk/blog/android-c2pa.html
djtango
1h 34m
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> Modern cameras rely on sophisticated image-processing algorithms to produce the final viewable image, so certifying that an image accurately reflects what a real camera sensor captured requires a chain of trust covering the sensor as well as the computational photography software that interpreted the capture. So if you jailbreak or root your phone what happens? Is this a trojan horse into making rooted phone cameras unverified? Just like how Linux machines can't watch Netflix in 4K
jeroenhd
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17m
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You'd need to jailbreak the camera sensor chip and the phone's secure element. Which isn't exactly impossible either, but it's harder. I don't think it has been done yet (but I'm sure it will be at some point).
modeless
2h 11m
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Gigachad
1h 23m
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Because it’s impossible to implement this feature in open source and out in the open. It relies on a locked down image pipeline and hidden key.
jeroenhd
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19m
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That's also why the approach is fundamentally flawed. The open-ish C2PA protocol has been "defeated" by tricking phones into signing arbitrary data already. The even-more-closed Apple version can be defeated the same way and relies on Apple to be the sole arbiter of truth.
tgsovlerkhgsel
2h 52m
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rickdeckard
39m
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I don't understand the vector of this: An insurance would either send #1 an insurance agent or mechanic to initially assess the damage (trusted) or #2 ask the customer to send pictures (untrusted). Tendency is #2 for cost-saving of the insurance, and 3rd party apps are used to execute this. Now the idea is that the insurance company discontinues the App and the (untrusted) customer must have an iPhone 18 Pro to make an insurance claim? Or is the insurance agent / mechanic an untrusted entity who will now be required to have an iPhone 18 Pro? What is the fraud vector here, and how can the insurance service provider continue cost-saving on damage-assessment by offloading to the customer, if the customer is required to own a specific device?
bayindirh
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18m
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Some banks needs photos of machine readable IDs to verify user details to fight fraud. These IDs can be passports or NFC enabled EU (and compatible) ID cards. This will allow banks to trust these cameras more on the long run, allowing higher security ID checks.
yreg
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21m
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> Now the idea is that the insurance company discontinues the App and the (untrusted) customer must have an iPhone 18 Pro to make an insurance claim? In a couple of years it will be almost any iPhone instead of 18 Pro. And if it catches on, other phone vendors will provide a similar service.
Topfi
42m
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> […] the potential to shift from "you need a smartphone to be able to live normally" to "you need an iPhone to be able to live normally". Why do you believe Android manufacturers and SOC makers like Qualcomm won’t be able to offer a similar solution?
jeroenhd
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13m
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A bunch of them already offer one. Have been a while, actually; the S25 and Pixel 10 came with exactly this. The timestamping server is the hard part, especially with the verified compute component. It's just not something I see Samsung doing. I expect Google to show up with a blog post titled "extending C2PA with timestamps for industry-leading authenticity confirmation" any time.
rickdeckard
31m
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Not the OP, but yes, other vendors will be able to support that as well. But a camera sensor that has 1. a public/private key exchanged during device-production (production-cost), 2. the capability to reboot in a cryptographic mode (R&D / component cost) and 3. a cloud-service which then processes the raw data to create a JPG (operational cost) comes at a premium. Why should this premium be applied on a 99 USD Smartphone? Which is my whole puzzle on this vector: If the big benefit is for insurance/ID-verification, which apply cost-saving by offloading their process to the untrusted customer, how much they can offload this by requiring their customer to own a 1000+ USD smartphone to provide THEIR service...? The most I can imagine is insurances offloading their work to OTHER companies, NOT trusting them and therefore requiring them to own a 1000+ USD Smartphone. But even then, why not use a third party app that also runs on a 3y old iPhone and a 99 USD Android device...?
Topfi
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18m
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We have 99USD smartphones with 1080p+ AMOLEDs, massive 5k amp batteries and very performant SOCs (e.g. Galaxy A16) among other costly, but not vital niceties. I struggle to see how cost could be a factor here.
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